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BEYOND REPUBLICAN PARTY V. WHITE:
A PLEA FOR A RULE OF REASON FOR
EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH
Thomas PenfieldJackson*

I.
I do not intend to offer a scholarly discussion of Republican Party
v. White' as Professor Hazard has done.2 My mission here today is to try
to convince what I suspect is a skeptical audience that the judiciary-in
particular, the federal judiciary-does itself a disservice by imposing a
blanket rule of silence on its judges with respect to issues and cases
before them. We should encourage a greater judicial willingness to
communicate informally with the public when appropriate, and always,
of course, in an appropriate manner.
It is common wisdom among federal judges that we are sworn to
ethical silence about our cases other than as we speak officially, orally or
in writing. We are not allowed to comment to the press. We are expected
to decline to answer case-specific questions before public audiences. We
must not elaborate informally on our rulings even for clarity's sake, or
ruminate on possible consequences from our decisions. We cannot point
out what we have not decided, or why. I have learned to my personal
discomfiture that we are subject to a virtual code of omerta, and to
breach it is an unpardonable sin.
Let me preface the observations to follow by reminding you that I
speak from the perspective of a federal district judge. There are certain
circumstances pertaining to the work of a trial judge that are absent in a
court of appeals, and it is my experience as the former that informs what
I have to say.
* Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
1. 535 U.S. 923 (2002).
2. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Announcement" By Federal Judicial Nominees, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1281 (2004).
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First, we are the court of first resort. We preside over and render
decisions in important or notorious cases in the certain knowledge that
our work will be examined critically by a court of appeals. That, in a
way, is reassuring: If we blunder badly, it will most surely be corrected
on appeal. Circuit judges, on the other hand, know that the likelihood
that their decisions will ever be scrutinized by the Supreme Court is
virtually nil.
Second, trial judges sit alone. We do not have the intellectual
reinforcement that comes from testing our convictions with peers, or,
conversely, the obligation to insure that the integrity of the collegial
deliberation process is respected.
Third, in protracted cases our exposure to public scrutiny may
extend over weeks and months. We are observed daily, for hours at a
time, and begin to develop a public persona created entirely from our
perception by the media, who tend to read portentous significance into
every word, gesture, or facial expression. In contrast, appellate judges
are rarely seen in public in regard to a single case for more than an hour
at a time.
II.
The operative commandment for federal judges is Canon 3A(6) of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3A(6) states that a judge "should
avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action."
It then expressly admits of exceptions for explanations of the legal
process and for purposes of "legal education. 3
As a cautionary precept of prudence, the Canon is undoubtedly
wise counsel: It tells us not to say anything for public consumption, on
or off the bench, that might sound prematurely judgmental or cast doubt
on the essential fairness of the proceedings.
As an enforceable rule of ethical conduct, however, I submit Canon
3A(6) is unconstitutional. It is clearly not narrowly tailored to address
the only legitimate purpose claimed for it, namely, to preserve public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. Even the stated
objective of the Canon is itself somewhat dubious as a compelling
governmental interest: The objective is cosmetic, not substantive. The
objective is to preserve an appearanceof impartiality 4 on the part of the

3.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (1999).

4. "A judge should perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently." CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3.
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judge. It does nothing to enhance the actuality of impartiality. A judge
who keeps his mouth shut can fairly seethe with bias or prejudice. No
one will ever know, or at least be able to prove it.
Finally, as one federal district judge in New York has already held
with respect to a state analog to the Canon, it is also unconstitutionally
vague. 5 Where does the "legal process" leave off and "the merits" begin?
Why doesn't it apply to questionable "public comment" from the bench
as well as off? Does it apply to any "pending case," or only those
pending before the judge who speaks? How long does a case remain
"pending"? "Pending" before whom? Until all possibility of further
appeal is exhausted? Is the exception for "legal education" only for law
students, or to educate the public at large about the law?
III.
Professor Hazard seems to have been startled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. Personally I
have expected something like it for several years. Professor Hazard is
clearly right, however, in perceiving it as a sea change in the law of
extrajudicial speech.6 And I agree with him that its effect will not be
limited to judicial election campaigns, or even to elected judges as
opposed to appointed judges. Neither dichotomy represents a natural or
rational constitutional fault line for separating the permissible from the
impermissible in what judges may say publicly, on or off the bench. I
expect that judges, including federal judges with life tenure, will be
subject to the same rule as are all other public servants: What they may
say with constitutional (and ethical) impunity will depend upon whether
any restrictions imposed are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.
Of one thing I am convinced, however: the Canon, as presently
interpreted, actually disserves the interest of the federal judiciary in one
respect, namely, in preserving its reputation for candor and openness.
Federal judges, respected as they generally have been, are also seen by
many as aloof, secretive, and unaccountable in their work to anyone.
That certainly is how we are perceived on Capitol Hill, as the following
points illustrate:

5. See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 91-92, vacated by
351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction).
6. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1281-82.
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- Mandatory minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing
Guidelines are both a direct result and incontrovertible evidence of
Congress's distrust of federal judges, requiring them to be sensitive toif not governed by-public opinion.
- While not discounting the importance of party politics in the
matter, a principal reason given by congressional opponents of certain
judicial appointments for their opposition is the refusal of the nominees
to answer questions about their views on controversial legal issues they
may confront.
- Senators have offered an amendment to the judicial pay bill
currently before Congress that permits federal courts to allow their
proceedings to be televised.7 One senator has proposed a requirement
that federal judges "stand for retention" before the Senate every 12
years, 8 which would require a constitutional amendment.
- Congressmen Lamar Smith and Steve Chabot have recently
formed the "House Working Group on Judicial Accountability," 9 whose
goal it is to make sure we understand that "the notion that judges are
above it all, that the judiciary is sacred and should be left alone ...[is]
wrong."' 0
Lest you think sentiment on Capitol Hill is driven by interbranch
jealousy and does not reflect public opinion at large, let me remind you
that, notwithstanding the potential for corruption in judicial elections,
public opinion polls reportedly continue to show a majority of the
country to favor elective over appointive state judicial systems."
We should acknowledge that federal judicial branch is, as a
practical matter, the most secretive branch of the federal government. It
is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 12 or any other so-called
7. S. 1023, 108th Cong. § 3(b) (2003) (reported as amended by Senator Hatch on June 18,
2003).
8. See Press Release, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson, Nelson Discusses Judicial Appointments
(June 13, 2003), at http://bennelson.senate.gov/2003/releases/udicial%20appointments.htm.
9. See Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith, Smith & Cabot Form Judicial
Accountability Group (July 23, 2003), at
http://lamarsmith.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=278.
10.

Todd J. Gilman, GOP Group Plans to Turn Up Scrutiny on FederalJudges, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2003 (quoting Representative Lamar Smith).
11. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., ABA, A STUDY ABOUT JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 4 (2002),
available at News Release, A.B.A., Poll: Confidence in Judiciary Eroded by Judges' Need to Raise
Campaign Money (August 12, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/media/aug02/apnews confrevised88.html.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004).
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"sunshine" statute. All of its important decisions are made behind closed
doors, whether by judges or juries. It vehemently opposes all cameras in
the courtroom and television coverage of its proceedings. It continues to
be portrayed pictorially in the media by quaint, hastily drawn courtroom
"sketches" reminiscent of Daumier. Our written decisions, no matter
how debatable, are the last word on a case unless and until the next
higher court takes it up. No follow-up questions are entertained.
A veteran journalist once told me "we know more about how the
CIA operates than we do about you."
IV.
Let me state emphatically that I am not advocating that judges hold
regular press conferences or issue press releases, or make regular
appearances on talk shows. As a general proposition judges should keep
their own counsel for a variety of reasons. As Sir Francis Bacon once
said, "An overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal." 13 Even though
they may become celebrities of sorts, judges shouldn't behave like them.
They also shouldn't waste time answering foolish questions over and
over again.
What I am advocating is employing a little common sense to a
general rule of reticence for judges. We are, after all, public servants as
much as are members of the political branches. The fact that we don't
have to justify ourselves to an electorate shouldn't mean that we must
always sanctimoniously refuse to do so. I believe we have a
responsibility to let the public see us as something other than imperious
authority figures in black robes. Loss of insularity does not necessarily
result in loss of dignity.
The effort expended in scolding or disciplining judges for speaking
in public would be better spent teaching them how to speak to the
public--on or off the bench-without doing damage to the judicial
image. That instruction would, of course, include an admonition not to
say anything that might prejudice prospective jurors or intrude upon jury
deliberations. In non-jury cases, a judge should not intimate any
predisposition on the part of the court before the record is complete and
the case decided. Appellate judges should never speak until collegial
deliberation is finished and all opinions issued.

13. FRANCIS BACON, THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS, CIVIL AND MORAL, OF FRANCIS LD.
VERULAM VISCOUNT ST. ALBANS 212 (Peter Pauper Press (n.d.)).
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It is also my conviction that one judge should never be personally
critical of another judge in public, orally or in print.
All of those proscriptions should apply, by the way, whether the
speaking judge is on or off the bench. And, of course, whatsoever is said
should always be couched in appropriately discreet language.
V.
Highly publicized cases inevitably generate a lot of public interest.
That interest often extends to a genuine curiosity about the judge who
presided over or decided the case, and with respect to subjects not
directly related to the outcome of the case. Like it or not, the judge
becomes a public figure--one with considerable power to affect the
course of events and the lives of many people.
Some years ago, having endured several high-profile trials and the
attendant publicity, I wrote an article about the adversary nature of the
fair-trial/free-press debate.1 4 I described the relationship between the
media and a newsworthy case as roughly equivalent to the relationship
between an infectious disease and a healthy organism. I offered some
lessons learned from my experiences to date to keep the judicial immune
system intact. The gist of those lessons was for a judge to force himself
to ignore the publicity and insulate himself from any contact with the
press altogether.
Unfortunately that formula will not always work.
In a truly celebrated case, awash with publicity day after day,
augmented with daily "public relations" pronouncements from the
parties, the ideal image of an "appearance of judicial impartiality"-the
remote, impassive judge-begins to disintegrate, and then to reassemble
itself in the shape of the Wizard of Oz. Unspoken questions begin to
loom in the public mind: Who is that pompous anonymity behind the
curtain, and why was he entrusted with deciding such an important
matter?
Like most judges who have had such cases, I receive requests for
interviews from the press, and invitations from educational institutions,
lawyers' associations, and community service organizations to speak to
them. Virtually all of them I ignore or reject. I have turned down offers
to appear on "60 Minutes" and "Nightline," and I refuse to speak to
journalists whom I know to have a point of view or a sensational agenda.
14. See Thomas Penfield Jackson, A Judicial Cynic's View of Why This Topic Is Always
Presentedas FairTrial Versus Free Press, 45 FED. LAW. 28 (1998).
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If, however, I trust the journalist-and some are trustworthy-and the
journalist's interest in knowing something about the case is genuine and
not merely a search for a quote, I will occasionally respond. When I do, I
try earnestly to be sure not to say anything likely to undermine the
public's faith in the fairness of the outcome, or at least the fairness of the
process leading to it.
Sometimes an "off the record" or "for background" response is
sufficient, but often it is not. Moreover, having been the subject of
"anonymous source" articles myself, I am generally distrustful of people
who refuse to be quoted by name. Except in true "whistleblower"
situations, one who declines to be identified with the information he
imparts is unlikely to be motivated by purely honorable intentions.
VI.
Why do we persist in insisting that judges remain mute when some
informed communication from them might truly contribute to public
understanding and acceptance of controversial decisions?
My answer is that, at bottom, it is mostly a matter of selfpreservation. Canon 3A(6) is our Fifth Amendment. It is routinely
invoked as a convenient excuse for judges to refuse to respond to even
the most innocuous and well-intentioned queries about cases that may be
of profound concern to many people for multiple good reasons.
We are grown accustomed to our ethically sanctioned right to
remain silent, and are comfortable with it. Even those of us who were
trial lawyers have become rusty in the art of parrying the spontaneous
question. We learn to choose our words carefully when writing our
opinions in solitude, but are clumsy in extemporaneous exchanges with
skilled interlocutors. We cherish our privilege to refuse to answer any
questions at all: It is far easier than trying to discern which questions can
be answered and which cannot, and, more difficult still, how to respond
intelligently to those that cannot without really answering, or diverting
the discourse to less dangerous ground.
In short, we take sanctuary in the rule of silence. Each of us stands
in terror of being quoted as saying the wrong thing at the wrong time,
just as we remain fearful of being captured on camera in an
uncomplimentary light.
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VII.
Whether or not the Supreme Court's opinion in Republican Party v.
White was the catalyst, there have been signs of late that the federal
judiciary may be relenting somewhat in its rigid interpretation of Canon
3A(6) and its attitude of privileged isolation from the world of public
discourse.
For example, in July 2003, two Supreme Court justices made an
unprecedented appearance on a Sunday morning TV talk show and
answered questions about the Court with remarkable candor.' 5 It was, I
am told, truly beneficial to the image of the Court. Where the justices
were criticized as less than convincing was in their adamant insistence
that television continue to be banned from all federal judicial
proceedings.
In August 2003, Justice Anthony Kennedy gave an equally
unprecedented speech to the American Bar Association denouncing16
federal mandatory minimum sentences as unjustly harsh and unwise.
Although Supreme Court Justices are not bound by Canon 3A(6), in
speaking as he did, let me emphasize, Justice Kennedy thus spoke
"publicly" about the "merits" of an issue that will be "pending" before
the Supreme Court in many contexts for years to come.
Still another example: In the summer of 2003, a round-table
colloquium was convened of three prominent journalists, with decades
of experience covering the federal courts.17 It was moderated by a fourth
journalist with similar credentials. The unanimous consensus was that
judges should be less reluctant to talk to the press. One journalist urged a
''recognition on both sides that [we] share [a] mutual interest [in] trying
to get accurate information [out] about what the federal courts are
doing."' 8 Another said, "We all hope to serve the public.., trying to
19
make sure that important matters are brought to the public's attention."

15. Justices Stephen Breyer and Sandra Day O'Connor appeared on "This Week" with
George Stephanopoulos. See This Week (ABC News television broadcast, July 6, 2003).
16. See Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.
17. See Journalists and the Courts: What Reporters Really Think About the Courts and
Judges, 35

THIRD BRANCH

7,

(Newsletter

of the

Fed.

Cts.)

July

2003

available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/july03ttb/Joumalists.index.html (providing excerpts of a discussion
between three participating journalists, Carl Stem, Stephen Wermiel, and Ron Ostrow, moderated
by Dick Carelli).
18. Id. (quoting Stephen Wermiel).
19. Id. (quoting Carl Stem).
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The fact of the colloquium is not surprising. What is surprising is
that it was convened under the auspices of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts ("A.O."), and the moderator was the former Associated
Press reporter for the Supreme Court, who is now with the A.O.'s Office
of Public Affairs. An account of the colloquium's proceedings was
published in the A.O.'s newsletter to the federal judiciary, The Third
Branch.
Such developments I find to be encouraging, and if the trend
continues, they may enhance rather than detract from a favorable image
of the federal judiciary in the eyes of Congress and the public.
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